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ABSTRACT
Voting is a mechanism of utmost importance to social pro-
cesses. In this paper, we focus on the strategic aspect of in-
formation security in voting procedures. We argue that the
notions of receipt-freeness and coercion resistance are under-
pinned by existence (or nonexistence) of a suitable strategy
for some participants of the voting process. In order to back
the argument formally, we provide logical “transcriptions”
of the informal intuitions behind coercion-related properties
that can be found in the existing literature. The transcrip-
tions are formulated in the modal game logic ATL∗, well
known in the area of multi-agent systems.
CCS Concepts
•Security and privacy→ Logic and verification; Privacy-
preserving protocols; Privacy protections; •Theory of com-
putation → Modal and temporal logics; •Applied com-
puting → Voting / election technologies;
Keywords
receipt freeness, coercion resistance
1. INTRODUCTION
Voting is a mechanism of utmost importance to social
processes, as many important decisions for the society are
made by means of elections and referenda. Digital tech-
nology holds out the promise of greater citizen engagement
in decision making. Throughout the history of democracy
elections have been the target of attempts to manipulate the
outcome. In order to counter threats of coercion or vote buy-
ing, ballot confidentiality was recognised an important prop-
erty of voting systems. More recently, cryptographers and
security experts have been looking at using cryptographic
mechanisms to provide voter-verifiability, i.e., the ability of
voters to confirm that their votes are correctly registered
and counted. Voter-verifiability strengthens the integrity of
the voting procedure, but, if it is not done carefully, it can
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introduce new threats to confidentiality. This leads to the
introduction of more sophisticated notions: receipt-freeness
and coercion-resistance. Receipt-freeness focuses on the re-
sources needed to construct a coercion attack, and requires
that the voter can obtain no certified information (a receipt)
which could be used to prove to a coercer that she voted in
a certain way. Coercion-resistance, on the other hand, is in-
tended to capture broader security concerns, guided by the
following intuition: whatever strategy the coercer adopts,
the voter always has a strategy to vote as they intend while
appearing to comply with all the coercer’s requirements.
In this paper, we focus on the strategic aspect of informa-
tion security in voting procedures. We argue that coercion-
related properties are underpinned by existence (or nonexis-
tence) of a suitable strategy for some participants: typically
for the voter, the coercer, or both. Such strategic behaviour
has been studied in game theory, social choice theory, and
theory of multi-agent systems. In particular, a number of
game logics have been proposed that can be used to specify
properties related to strategic ability. Here, we use formulae
of the game logic ATL∗ to encode and disambiguate differ-
ent flavours of receipt-freeness and coercion resistance.
In the existing literature, coercion-related properties are
typically formulated on two levels of abstraction. On one
hand, the informal intuition usually builds upon abilities of
participants in the interaction between the voter and the po-
tential coercer. That is, it refers to the existence or nonex-
istence of suitable strategies for players in the real game
between the voter and the coercer.
On the other hand, the formal definition specifies a math-
ematical structure to which the property is related, and
defines how to evaluate the property based on the struc-
ture. Some of the formal definitions are game-based, but
the games used there are primarily mathematical devices to
define the concept, much like in case of the game seman-
tics for first-order predicate logic, or the game semantics of
programming languages. It is not the real game between
participants of the voting process, but rather an abstract
game between the “verifier” trying to prove the property
true, and the “falsifier” that attempts the opposite. Thus,
strategy-based definitions of coercion resistance and receipt-
freeness are either informal, or use strategies that have no
obvious relation to the real behavior of actual participants
in the voting process. The closest work we know of, that
has formalized the coercion resistance property as strategic
abilities of the participants, is the the work of Kusters et al.
[34]. They have formalized the property as a quantitative
measure showing how well a coercer can distinguish between
the strategy he has prescribed to the coerced voter, and a
counter-strategy used by the voter. However for formaliz-
ing the property they have also used a cryptographic model,
rather than a model oriented for specifying strategic abilities
of players.
The aim of this paper is to provide logical “transcrip-
tions” of the informal intuitions that can be found in the
literature. The work is still very preliminary. Nevertheless,
the transcriptions formally expose the strategic nature of
coercion-related properties, and allow to demonstrate some
differences between the existing approaches.
2. RELATEDWORK
The related work can be divided into two strands. On
one hand, the concepts of receipt-freeness and coercion resis-
tance have been defined and discussed in multiple variants.
On the other hand, some authors have attempted to capture
several security properties in modal logics of time, knowl-
edge, and/or strategies. We briefly discuss both strands be-
low.
Receipt-freeness and coercion resistance. In 1994,
Benolah and Tuinstra [9] introduced receipt freeness as a
required property for avoiding coercion in e-voting systems.
Later Michels et al. [40] extended the concept by consid-
ering different levels of voter-control for the coercers, and
different levels of collusion between coercer and other par-
ties in the election. Okamoto and Tatsuaki [45] developed
the formal definition of [9] to make it more appropriate for
large scale elections. In 2005, Juels et al. [29] introduced
coercion resistance as the property of being receipt freeness,
plus resisting against randomization, forced abstention and
simulation attacks.
Delaune et al. have a series of works [21, 19, 20] in which
they have formalized receipt freeness and coercion resistance
properties in applied pi calculus. Moran and Naor [44] intro-
duced a simulation based definition for coercion resistance.
Backes et al. [6] introduced a definition of coercion resis-
tance in symbolic model which was more suitable for au-
tomation than previous works. Meng [39] provided a state
of the art survey on the definitions of receipt-freeness and
coercion-resistance and on what technologies are used at the
time to implement these property in voting schemes.
Kuesters et al. [34] introduced a formalisation of coercion
resistance which could provide a probabilistic measure of the
amount of coercion resistance in a voting scheme. Dreier et
al. [22] provided formal definitions of various privacy notions
in applied pi calculus, and showed how they are related to
each other.
Several works such as [38, 36, 1, 35, 32, 51, 5, 48], without
introducing new definitions of receipt freeness and coercion
resistance properties, have developed weaker, more practi-
cal, or more efficient ways to realize the needed assumptions
for achieving these properties (assumptions such as existence
of untappable channels, anonymous channels, etc.).
Also some works, such as [28, 7, 33] have used formal logic
to express coercion resistance property in elections. Junker
and Pieters [28] and Baskar et al. [7] defined the receipt
freeness property in terms of knowledge of the agents. Also
Kusters and Truderung [33] used an epistemic approach for
defining the coercion resistance property in elections. The
main difference between our approach and these works is
that neither of them have incorporated strategic abilities
of the participants as a parameter in defining the security
properties.
Specification of security in modal logics of time, knowl-
edge, and/or strategies. There has been some research
on specification of security properties in combinations of
temporal, epistemic, and strategic logics, especially in the
context of model checking. Temporal-epistemic logic CTLK,
together with the modeling methodology of interpreted sys-
tems, has been used to specify and verify properties of cryp-
tographic protocols, including authentication protocols [37,
10], and authentication as well as key-establishment proto-
cols [13]. CTLK was also used to disambiguate and con-
struct a taxonomy of specifications for detectability of at-
tacks on information security [11].
An extension of CTLK with reasoning modulo equational
theories was used in [12] to construct and verify multi-agent
models of electronic voting protocols automatically extracted
from high-level descriptions. The following properties were
considered: vote privacy, voter-vote unlinkability, receipt-
freeness, and coercion-resistance. Thus, the agenda of [12]
comes very close to what we address in this paper. However,
their specifications of the security properties are completely
different from ours – in particular, they leave the strategic
aspects implicit and buried deep in the detailed structure of
their models.
Modal logics with explicit modalities for strategic play
have been, to the best of our knowledge, only used to spec-
ify and verify correctness of contract signing protocols [30],
to specify and analysis of multiparty contract-signing proto-
cols [16], and specify a taxonomy of security properties for
non-repudiation and fair exchange protocols [31, 26].
3. LOGICS OF STRATEGIC ABILITY
The idea behind this paper is to capture the intuitive
meaning of coercion-related properties by formal specifica-
tions that explicitly refer to the strategic interaction between
the voter(s) and the coercer(s). We will show a number of
logical formulae that refer to the existence (or nonexistence)
of strategies to coerce (resp. to defend from coercion). To
this end, we will use modal logics of strategic ability, or modal
game logics [8, 4, 50, 17, 43], that have gained much popu-
larity within Artificial Intelligence in the last 20 years.
There are many syntactic and semantic variants of game
logics. In this paper, we use alternating-time temporal logic
ATL whose formulae allow for expressing statements about
the existence of a surely winning strategy to achieve a given
temporal goal.
3.1 What Agents Can Achieve: ATL andATL*
Alternating-time temporal logic [3, 4] generalizes branching-
time temporal logic CTL? [23] by replacing path quantifiers
E,A with strategic modalities 〈〈A〉〉. Informally, 〈〈A〉〉γ says
that a group of agents A has a collective strategy to enforce
temporal property γ. ATL∗ formulas can include temporal
operators: “X” (“in the next state”), “G” (“always from now
on”), “F” (“now or sometime in the future”), and U (strong
“until”). Similarly to CTL? and CTL, we consider two syn-
tactic variants of the alternating-time logic, namely ATL∗
and ATL.
Syntax. Formally, let Agt be a finite set of agents, and
PV a countable set of atomic propositions. The language of
ATL∗ is defined as follows:
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Figure 1: Autonomous vehicles at the intersection:
model M1
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉γ,
γ ::= ϕ | ¬γ | γ ∧ γ | Xγ | γU γ.
where A ⊆ Agt and p ∈ PV . Derived boolean connectives
and constants (∨,>,⊥) are defined as usual. “Sometime”,
“weak until”, and “always from now on” are defined as Fγ ≡
>U γ, γ1 W γ2 ≡ ¬((¬γ2) U (¬γ1 ∧¬γ2)), and Gγ ≡ γW⊥.
ATL (without “star”) is the syntactic variant in which
strategic and temporal operators are combined into com-
pound modalities:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉Xϕ | 〈〈A〉〉ϕUϕ | 〈〈A〉〉ϕWϕ.
Models. The semantics of ATL∗ is defined over a variant
of synchronous multi-agent transition systems.
Definition 3.1 (CGS). A concurrent game structure
(CGS) is a tuple M = 〈Agt, St, Act, d, o, PV, V 〉 which in-
cludes nonempty finite sets of: agents Agt = {1, . . . , k},
states St, actions Act, atomic propositions PV , and a propo-
sitional valuation V : St → 2PV . The function d : Agt ×
St → 2Act defines availability of actions. The (determin-
istic) transition function o assigns a successor state q′ =
o(q, α1, . . . , αk) to each state q ∈ St and any tuple of ac-
tions αi ∈ d(i, q) that can be executed by Agt in q.
A pointed CGS is a pair (M, q0) consisting of a concurrent
game structure M and an initial state q0 in M .
Example 3.1 (Driving agents). Consider an inter-
section with two autonomous vehicles around it. Each ve-
hicle i is modeled as a separate agent, whose local state is
characterized by either the proposition outi (when the vehicle
is outside the intersection) or ini (when the vehicle is inside
it). The available actions are: in (“drive in” or “stay in”, de-
pending on the current state) and out (“drive out” or “stay
out”). Transitions update the state accordingly, except for
one case: when both agents are in and decide to leave at the
same time, a collision occurs (collision).
Figure 1 presents a pointed CGS modeling this scenario.
The combinations of actions that are not displayed in the
graph do not change the state of the system.
Strategies and their outcomes. Given a CGS, we define
the strategies and their outcomes as follows. A strategy for
a is a function sa : St→ Act such that sa(q) ∈ d(a, q).1 The
set of such strategies is sometimes denoted by ΣIra , with the
capital “I” referring to perfect Information, and the lower-
case “r” for possibly imperfect recall. A collective strategy
for a group of agents A = {a1, . . . , ar} is a tuple of individ-
ual strategies sA = 〈sa1 , . . . , sar 〉. The set of such strategies
is denoted by ΣIrA.
A path λ = q0q1q2 . . . in a CGS is an infinite sequence of
states such that there is a transition between each qi, qi+1.
λ[i] denotes the ith position on λ (starting from i = 0)
and λ[i,∞] the suffix of λ starting with i. The “outcome”
function out(q, sA) returns the set of all paths that can occur
when agents A execute strategy sA from state q onward.
Function out(q, sA) returns the set of all paths λ ∈ Stω that
may occur when agents A execute strategy sA from state q
onward, defined as follows:
out(q, sA) = {λ = q0, q1, q2 . . . | q0 = q and for each i =
0, 1, . . . there exists 〈αia1 , . . . , αiak 〉 such that αia ∈ da(qi)
for every a ∈ Agt, and αia = sA[a](qi) for every a ∈ A,
and qi+1 = o(qi, α
i
a1 , . . . , α
i
ak )}.
Semantics. The semantics of ATL∗ is defined by the fol-
lowing clauses:
M, q |= p iff q ∈ V (p), for p ∈ PV ;
M, q |= ¬ϕ iff M, q 6|= ϕ;
M, q |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 iff M, q |= ϕ1 and M, q |= ϕ2;
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉γ iff there is a strategy sA ∈ ΣIrA such that,
for each path λ ∈ out(q, sA), we have M,λ |= γ.
M,λ |= ϕ iff M,λ[0] |= ϕ;
M,λ |= ¬γ iff M,λ 6|= γ;
M,λ |= γ1 ∧ γ2 iff M,λ |= γ1 and M,λ |= γ2;
M,λ |= Xγ iff M,λ[1,∞] |= γ; and
M,λ |= γ1 U γ2 iff there is an i ∈ N0 such that M,λ[i,∞] |=
γ2 and M,λ[j,∞] |= γ1 for all 0 ≤ j < i.
Example 3.2 (Driving agents, ctd.). For model M1,
we have M1, qoo |= 〈〈1〉〉G¬collision: agent 1 can avoid the
collision forever (the obvious strategy is to never enter the
crossroads). On the other hand, the agent cannot ensure the
collision even if it wants to: M1, qoo |= ¬〈〈1〉〉Fcollision. This
can only be guaranteed if the agents cooperate: M1, qoo |=
〈〈1, 2〉〉Fcollision. Moreover, M1, qoo |= 〈〈1〉〉Fin1 ∧ 〈〈2〉〉Fin2:
each agent is able to enter the intersection. Still, it cannot
successfully drive through the crossroads on its own (e.g.,
M1, qoo 6|= 〈〈1〉〉F(in1 ∧Fout1)). Finally, if the agents cooper-
ate, they can make sure that they successfully drive through
the crossroads: M1, qoo |= 〈〈1, 2〉〉F(in1 ∧ Fout1).
3.2 Abilities under Imperfect Information
ATL∗ was originally proposed for reasoning about agents
in perfect information scenarios. However, realistic multi-
agent interaction always includes some degree of limited ob-
servability [50, 27, 2, 24, 25, 49]. Here, we use the classical
1This corresponds to the notion of memoryless or positional
strategies. In other words, we assume that the memory of
agents is explicitly defined by the states of the model.
variant of “ATL∗ with imperfect information” from [50], de-
fined as follows.
First, we extend concurrent game structures with indis-
tinguishability relations ∼1, . . . ,∼k, one per agent in Agt.
Now, strategies must specify identical choices in indistin-
guishable situations. That is, strategies with imperfect in-
formation (ir strategies, for short) are functions sa : St →
Act such that (1) sa(q) ∈ d(a, q), and (2) if q ∼a q′ then
sa(q) = sa(q
′).2 As before, collective strategies for A ⊆ Agt
are tuples of individual strategies for a ∈ A. We denote the
set of A’s imperfect information strategies by ΣirA.
The semantics of “ATL∗ with imperfect information” dif-
fers from the one presented in Section 3.1 only in the clause
for strategic modality:
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉γ iff there is a strategy sA ∈ ΣirA such that,
for every agent a ∈ A, state q′ such that q ∼a q′, and
path λ ∈ out(q′, sA), we have that M,λ |= γ.
In other words, the agents in A should have an executable
strategy which enforces γ from all the states that at least
one member of the coalition considers possible.
Example 3.3 (Intersection with limited visibility).
Take model M1 from Example 3.1, and assume that no agent
sees the location of the other vehicle. This can be modeled by
the following indistinguishability relations: qoo ∼1 qoi and
qii ∼1 qio; qoo ∼2 qio and qoi ∼2 qii. Now, we still have
e.g. that M2, qoo |= 〈〈1〉〉G¬collision (it suffices that agent 1
executes action “out” regardless of anything) On the other
hand, M2, qoo |= ¬〈〈1, 2〉〉Fcollision (the agents cannot make
sure that a collision will happen, even if they want to). We
leave it up to the interested reader to check the latter.
3.3 Knowledge and Belief Modalities
Coercion resistance and receipt-freeness are privacy-type
properties. In this sense, they are related to the knowledge
and/or beliefs of the adversary about a given secret. In case
of elections, the secret is usually the value of the voter’s
vote. Thus, we will need modalities for knowledge (resp. be-
liefs). The former is formalized by epistemic formulae of
type Kaϕ, expressing that agent a knows that ϕ holds, with
the following semantics:
M, q |= Kaϕ iff, for every state q′ such that q ∼a q′, we
have that M, q′ |= ϕ.
It is interesting to observe that this modality is in fact su-
perfluous in “ATL∗ with imperfect information,” since we
can equivalently express Kaϕ by 〈〈a〉〉ϕUϕ.
The modality for beliefs is very similar. Baϕ expresses
that a believes that φ holds, and exactly the same semantic
clause can be used to interpret Kaϕ and Baϕ. The difference
lies in the axiomatic properties. For knowledge, the indis-
tinguishability relation is assumed to be an equivalence (i.e.,
reflexive, symmetric, and transitive), whereas for beliefs it is
sufficient to have it serial, symmetric and Euclidean. Thus,
whenever the indistinguishability relation ∼a is an equiv-
alence, one can use Ka to address the subjective view of
player a; otherwise Ba should be used.
4. EXPRESSING INFORMALDEFINITIONS
OFCOERCION-RELATEDPROPERTIES
2Again, we consider only positional strategies here.
In order to express security properties of a voting system,
we assume that the voting process is modeled as a concur-
rent game structure where the set of players Agt includes
the set of voters V , the coercer c, and possibly some other
players. Let Bal be the set of possible “ballot values,” i.e.,
ways in which a ballot can be cast by a voter. In a simple
majority voting procedure where each voter votes for one of
the candidates, Bal is the set of candidates. We assume that
the states where voter v ∈ V has already voted are labeled
by the atomic proposition votedv,i, where i ∈ Bal indicates
how v voted.
For this work, we have chosen several important papers on
preventing coercion in elections. In each of the papers, an
informal intuition is first given, and later followed by a for-
mal definition that typically uses some heavy mathematical
machinery. Here, we only look at the informal intuitions,
in order to provide their transcriptions in the game logic
ATL∗. To make the list easier to read, we label the proper-
ties to be transcribed as either (RFx) for variants of receipt
freeness properties, and (CRx) for variants of coercion re-
sistance.
4.1 Benaloh and Tuinstra (1994)
(RF1) For a voting system to be uncoercable, no voter
should be able to convince any other participant of
the value of its vote. [9]
This paper introduced the notion of receipt freeness. They
showed with some examples why giving a “receipt” to the
voter can be harmful, as it prevents the voter from being
be able to deceive the coercer. Therefore through the paper
“uncoercibility” is regarded equivalent to receipt freeness.
For expressing this definition, we need to interpret two
terms to convince’ and other participants. We can consider
“other participants” to be the set of all voters, or to be the
set of all players. The more subtle term to interpret is “to
convince”. It can both mean to prove to someone about one’s
vote value, and to make someone believe that the voter has
voted in a particular way. In the first case the knowledge
modality is the right one to use and in the second case the
belief modality. However, because in this definition “being
unable to convince” is used only for the actual vote of the
voter, we decide to use knowledge modality for expressing
the property. Therefore definition (RF1), if we consider
“other participants” to be the set of voters, can be expressed
as: ∧
v,v′∈V \{c}
v 6=v′
∧
i∈Bal
¬〈〈v〉〉F(votedv,i ∧Kv′votedv,i),
or if we consider “other participants” to be any other player
in the model:∧
v∈V
∧
a∈Agt
v 6=a
∧
i∈Bal
¬〈〈v〉〉F(votedv,i ∧Kavotedv,i).
Note that
∧
is not a first order quantifier but a conjunc-
tion of finitely many subformulae. Thus, the above specifi-
cations are propositional modal formulae of finite length.
4.2 Juels, Catalano, and Jakobsson (2005)
This paper introduced the notion of coercion resistance
property as an improvement over receipt freeness. We start
by the definition of receipt freeness as given in this work:
(RF2) Receipt-freeness is the inability of a voter to prove
to an attacker that she voted in a particular manner,
even if the voter wishes to do so. [29]
This definition is very similar to (RF1) The difference
is that instead of any other player, we use a coercer player
as the adversary. Although one might think the two inter-
pretations imply each other, they can in fact have different
nuances. One may define specific abilities for the adver-
saries in the model that are not different from those acces-
sible to the voters, or other players in the system. Also one
might consider some (maybe powerful) players in the model
as trustworthy and decide not to include them in the set of
coercers. The definition (RF2) then can be expressed as
follows: ∧
v∈V \{c}
∧
i∈Bal
¬〈〈v〉〉F(votedv,i ∧Kcvotedv,i).
The definition of the coercion resistance property given
in this paper is meant to give extra protection, where re-
ceipt freeness fails to protect an election system against sev-
eral forms of serious, real-world attack, specifically against
randomization attacks, forced abstention attacks, and sim-
ulation attacks. In randomization attack the coercer asks
the voter to use some randomization method for choosing
her vote. In forced abstention attack the attacker wants the
voter to avoid voting in the election, and in simulation at-
tack the attacker himself simulate the role of the voter (for
example by causing her to divulge her private keying mate-
rial after the registration, but prior to the election process).
(CR1) A coercion-resistant voting system is one in which
the user can deceive the adversary into thinking that
she has behaved as instructed, when the voter has
in fact cast a ballot according to her own intentions.
[29]
This definition includes instructions of the coercer to the
voter. The paper explains that this instructions can be vot-
ing for a specific candidate, but also abstaining from voting,
randomizing the vote, and in general any specific behavior
during the election process. Here, we focus only on instruct-
ing to vote for a specific candidate and abstaining from vot-
ing, and we discuss the other cases later. Notice that in
this definition, the voter intends to deceive the adversary to
accept the voter has voted in a way which is not the actual
vote of the voter. This means that the knowledge modal-
ity cannot be used here, because in classical epistemic logic
knowledge about a proposition implies the truth of it in all
possible worlds. Hence we use belief modalities in this case.
The - narrowly interpreted - expression of definition (CR1)
then can be as follows:∧
v∈V \{c}
∧
i,j∈Bal
〈〈v〉〉F(votedv,i ∧Bcvotedv,j).
4.3 Delaune, Kremer, and Ryan (2005)
(RF3) An election protocol is receipt-free if a voter A can-
not prove to a potential coercer C that she voted in
a particular way. We assume that A wishes to co-
operate with C; receipt-freeness guarantees that such
cooperation will not be worthwhile, because it will be
impossible for C to obtain proof about how A voted.
[21]
The paper proposed a formalization of receipt freeness in
applied pi calculus. Here, unlike the previous definitions,
a cooperation between the coercer and the voter has been
mentioned explicitly. Expressing this definition can be as
follows: ∧
v∈V \{c}
∧
i∈Bal
¬〈〈c, v〉〉F(votedv,i ∧Kcvotedv,i).
4.4 Moran and Naor (2006)
(RF4) A voting system is receipt free, if a voter is unable
to convince a third party of her vote even if she wants
to do so. [44]
This work gives a formal definition for receipt freeness in
computation model. The differences between this definition
and (RF3) is that firstly here the adversary can be any
other player, and secondly the term “”to convince” is used
instead of “to prove”. We can include the latter by replacing
the knowledge modality with belief modality. So (RF4) can
be expressed as follows:∧
v∈V
∧
a∈Agt
v 6=a
∧
i∈Bal
¬〈〈v〉〉F(votedv,i ∧Bavotedv,i).
4.5 Backes, Hritcu, and Maffei (2008)
(RF5) A voting system satisfies receipt freeness, if a co-
ercer cannot force a voter to cast a certain vote and to
provide a receipt that would certify her vote. [6]
This paper provided a formalization of coercion resistance
and receipt freeness in applied pi calculus. A key term in the
informal definition here is “to force”. Because there is not a
way to exactly express forcing someone to do something in
ATL, we interpret it as though the coercer has a way to make
voter to commit to a mutual strategy. In this way, forcing
the voter can be interpreted as having a mutual strategy with
the voter. The other key term here is “the receipt”. Again,
for being able to express the informal definition in ATL, we
replace the concept of existence of a receipt ’ with a more
general concept of existence a strategy to prove the value
of the vote. With these interpretations we can express the
definition as follows, which is similar to (RF3):∧
v∈V \{c}
∧
i∈Bal
¬〈〈c, v〉〉F(votedv,i ∧Kcvotedv,i).
4.6 Delaune, Kremer, and Ryan (2010)
(RF6) A voting system is receipt free, if the voter does
not obtain any artefact (a “receipt”) which can be used
later to prove to another party how she voted. [20]
Here again similar to definition (RF5), we translate the
having a receipt to having a strategy to prove the value of
the vote. Therefore the definition can be expressed as:∧
v∈V
∧
a∈Agt
v 6=a
∧
i∈Bal
¬〈〈v〉〉F(votedv,i ∧Kavotedv,i).
(CR2) A voting system is coercion resistant, if the link
between a voter and her vote cannot be established by
an attacker, even if the voter cooperates with the at-
tacker during the election process. We assume that the
voter and the attacker can communicate and exchange
data at any time during the election process. [20]
If we translate establishing a link between a voter and her
vote by knowing the value of the vote of the voter, then this
definition can be expressed similar to definitions (RF3) and
(RF5): ∧
v∈V \{c}
∧
i∈Bal
¬〈〈c, v〉〉F(votedv,i ∧Kcvotedv,i).
On the other hand, if we take it as a more general concept
of finding any correlation between the voter and his vote,
then we can express it as:∧
v∈V \{c}
∧
i∈Bal
¬〈〈c, v〉〉F(votedv,i ∧
∨
j∈Bal\{i}
Kc¬votedv,j).
4.7 Kusters, Truderung and Vogt (2010)
(CR3) A voting system is coercion resistant, if there exists
a counter-strategy for the voter such that the coercer
cannot tell whether the coerced voter is in fact fol-
lowing the coercer’s instructions or whether she is just
running the counter-strategy, and hence, achieves her
own goal. [34]
The counter-strategy of the voter in this definition has to
satisfy two conditions. Firstly it has to be indistinguishable
from the instructed strategy of the coercer, and secondly
makes the voter achieves her goal. Here again we focus only
on the simple case where the coercer’s instruction is basically
voting for a certain candidate, and the goal of the voter is
voting for her preferred candidate. The definition then can
be expressed as follows:
∧
v∈V \{c}
∧
i,j∈Bal
i6=j
〈〈v〉〉F(votedv,i ∧G¬Kc¬votedv,j).
That is, the voter always has a strategy to eventually vote
for her preferred candidate, and be sure that the coercer
never finds out that she has disobeyed his instruction.
4.8 Randomization and Forced Abstention At-
tacks
In several definitions of coercion resistance, like (CR1),
the security property is meant to satisfy receipt freeness, but
also protect against forced abstention attacks and random-
ization attack. We have omitted those kinds attacks in the
previous subsections. Here, we tentatively suggest how re-
sistance to randomization and forced abstention attacks can
be specified.
Randomization attack happens when the coercer wants
the voter to cast her vote in a way that the result follows
some probability distribution, for example uniform distri-
bution over the set of candidates. However, if the coercer
instructs the voter to “vote at random with uniform distri-
bution over the candidates”, he will have no way of check-
ing whether the voter followed his instruction. Therefore,
in case of election a randomization attack is possible only
when there exist a more tangible property (from the point
of view of the coercer) for verifying the randomness of a
single cast vote. It must be, at least in principle, possible
for the coercer to verify the property based on the actual
sequence of events (and not the voter’s behavior as a whole,
which is inaccessible to the coercer). For example in Preˆt a`
Voter [18, 47], the list of candidates are printed in a com-
pletely random way on each ballot. Therefore if the coercer
asks the voter to “cross the first slot in the ballot”, this is
potentially verifiable, and indirectly it implies random vot-
ing of the voter. In fact, the voter always has the possibility
of auditing a ballot and obtaining a new one, so the voter
has a counter strategy to obtain a ballot with her candidate
in the coercer specified position, but of course this would be
tedious to execute for complex ballots.
To make this idea more general, we can represent feasible
randomization attacks by a state property p, such that the
occurrence of p implies random behavior of the voter, in the
way intended by the coercer. For example, the above sce-
nario can be represented by p ≡ crossedv,1, where crossedv,n
expresses that voter v has crossed the nth slot on the ballot.
Then, resistance to randomization attacks can be approxi-
mated by the following formula:∧
v∈V \{c}
¬〈〈c, v〉〉FKcp.
That is, there is no collective strategy for the coercer and
the voter (even assuming that they fully cooperate) such
that at some point the coercer will know that p has oc-
curred, and hence conclude that the voter has followed his
instruction.
Forced abstention attack happens when the coercer wants
the voter to behave such that her vote does not affect the
final ballot counting result. It can be simply asking the voter
not to cast a vote, but also can be wanting the voter to cast
a vote in a way that is considered a spoilt vote. For the
case of asking for casting a spoilt vote, the formalization
can be similar to the case of randomization attack, where
occurrence of a potentially verifiable state property p means
that a spoilt vote is cast by the voter. For the case where the
coercer asks the voter not to participate in the election(or
not to cast a vote) the protection against forced abstention
attack can be expressed as follows:∧
v∈V \{c}
¬〈〈c, v〉〉G
( ∧
i∈Bal
¬votedv,i ∧Kc
∧
i∈Bal
¬votedv,i
)
.
That is, there is no collective strategy for the coercer and
the voter such that at any time after the end of the election
time, the coercer knows that the voter has voted for a can-
didate (any candidate, even if the coercer cannot figure out
which one).
5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
In this work we have provided logical transcriptions of the
informal form of the definitions of the coercion resistance
and receipt freeness properties that can can be found in the
literature. Our focus in these transcriptions was to show
the role of strategic abilities of the participants in an elec-
tion system in defining coercion related properties. To this
end, we used formulae of the game logic ATL∗ for express-
ing these properties, and demonstrated some differences be-
tween the existing approaches.
There are many possible paths for future work. Among
other things, we plan to refine our specifications using the
more flexible language of Strategy Logic [43, 41, 42] that
allows for explicit quantification over strategies in k-player
concurrent games. In particular, this should allow for a more
general specification of resistance to randomization and ab-
stention attacks, by directly encoding that the coercer is un-
able to distinguish between the actual behavior of the voter
and the behavior prescribed by the coercer.
Perhaps more importantly, we will try to map the for-
mal definitions of receipt-freeness and coercion resistance
from [9, 29, 21, 44, 6, 20, 34] to models and formulae of game
logics, in order to study the precise relationship between the
informal intuitions and their formalizations. Adapting the
ATL model checking algorithms so that they can be used
to verify coercion-related properties is the third line that we
envisage for future research.
Finally, we plan to study how opacity, as defined by Bryans
et al. [14, 15] can be expressed in ATL, and more specif-
ically how to to define coercion resistance as a flavour of
opacity, similar to the style suggested in [46].
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